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IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES IN NEW MEXICO
BY PROOF OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
Proving that a witness has on some occasion prior to trial made a statement
inconsistent with his present testimony is probably the most popular and effective
mode of impeachment.' Impeachment by proof of prior inconsistent statements
has a long history and numerous rules governing its use have developed which
lay an easy trap for the unwary examiner.
In New Mexico, use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach is governed
primarily by the following statutes:
(1) Inconsistent Statements Not in Writing:
If a witness, upon cross-examination as to a former statement made
by him relative to the subject-matter of the cause, and inconsistent
with his present testimony, does not distinctly admit that he did make
such statement, proof may be given that he did in fact make it, but
before such proof can be given the circumstances of the supposed
statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be
mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he did
2
make such statement.
(2) Inconsistent Writings:
Upon the trial of any cause a witness may be cross-examined as to
previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing,
relative to the subject-matter of the cause without such writing being
shown to him, but if it is intended to contradict the witness by the
writing, his attention must, before such contradictory proof can be
given, be called to those parts of the writing which are to be used for
8
the purpose of so contradicting him.
(3) Inconsistent Statements of Own Witness:
[I]n case . . . [a party's own] witness, in the opinion of the judge,
proves adverse, such party may prove that the witness made at other
times a statement inconsistent with his present testimony; but before
such last mentioned proof can be given the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must
be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not
4
he did make such statement.
1.
2.
3.
4.

See McCormick, Evidence § 33 (1954).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-2 (1953).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-1 (1953).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-4 (1953).
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To avoid confusion insofar as possible, the person to be impeached by proof
of the prior inconsistent statement (the primary witness) will often be referred
to as W. Analysis will be facilitated by remembering there are two ways to
prove a prior inconsistent statement: first, by obtaining an admission from the
primary witness; second, by introducing extrinsic evidence. Distinct problems
are raised by each method.

The topics to be considered are: (I) How the Primary Witness is Impeached
by a Prior Inconsistent Statement, (II) Limitations on the Subject-Matter of
the Prior Inconsistent Statement, (III) Necessity of an Inconsistency, (IV)
Effect of an Admission of a Prior Inconsistent Statement, (V) Foundation for
Introducing Evidence, and (VI) Competency of the Impeaching Evidence.
I
How THE

PRIMARY WITNESS Is IMPEACHED By A
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT

Little discussion is found concerning how a witness is impeached by showing
he has made a prior inconsistent statement. Wigmore theorizes that the statement shows "the witness to be in general capable of making errors in his
testimony." He believes that whatever the cause for the inconsistency, W's
general credibility has been impeached because the court is willing to conclude
that if W' is capable of making errors on the particular point, he is capable of
making errors on other points. McCormick, on the other hand, says the inconsistency casts doubt on the truthfulness of both the statement at trial and the
prior statement.6 This seems the better theory since it focuses attention on the
weight to be given W's testimony on the particular point, not merely on the
weight to be given his overall testimony. Certainly, both of the statements
cannnot be true; and the inconsistency justifys the jury's disregard of W's
testimony on the particular point.
Under either of the above theories the prior statement is offered to show
an inconsistency from which inferences may be drawn. The prior statement
cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted as it would be hearsay
when offered for that purpose. 7 Although the rule thus limiting use of the
statement to impeachment has been severely criticised, s it is well settled and
arguments for its abolition are beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient
to say the prior inconsistent statement may not be used to prove the truth of
the matter asserted in the statement and use of the testimony must be strictly
limited to impeachment.
5. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1017 (3d ed. 1940).
6. McCormick, Evidence § 34 (1954).

7. McCormick, Evidence § 39 (1954).
8. See, e.g., 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1018 (3d ed. 1940) ; McCormick, Evidence § 39
(1954).
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II
LIMITATIONS ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRIOR
INCONSISTENT STATEMENT

According to the general rule, extrinsic proof of a prior inconsistent statement will not be admitted if the subject of the statement is "collateral." 9 In New
Mexico, under Section 20-2-2, the statement must be "relative to the subjectmatter of the cause." Since either rule is inherently ambiguous, application must
turn on the rule's purpose.
As a matter of trial expedience, some reasonable limitation must be placed
on proof of prior inconsistent statements. The essential question is how far
down the chain of inferences from the ultimate fact the subject matter of the
prior inconsistent statement may be before the court should conclude that the
statement's probative value is too slight to justify the court's time and the risk
of confusing the jury. This balancing process should control introduction of
the statement.
Our Supreme Court has not analyzed the problem of "collateralness" in terms
of Section 20-2-2; instead, it has fallen back on what Dean Leon Green calls

the "word ritual" of simply repeating traditional common law language: if the
prior inconsistent statement goes to one of the "issues" in the case, its subject
is not "collateral and immaterial." 10 Also, it may be introduced if it goes to a
"relevant or competent issue"11 or bears "directly upon the question whether
2
appellant did it."1
In addition to going directly to the merits, prior inconsistent statements going
initially to W's interest or bias are properly introduced.' 3 Apparently both types
of statements meet the requirement of Section 20-2-2 by going to a subject
which is "relative to the subject-matter of the cause."
This is all we have on the topic of what affirmatively is a proper subject for
impeachment under the general rule of the statute. It is well to note that in
appraising the value of a prior inconsistent statement the court must keep in
mind that the statement cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted
unless some hearsay exception is found.
Another line of cases establishes one situation where impeachment by extrinsic
proof of the prior inconsistent statement will not be allowed. Suppose D is on
trial for the murder of X. Z, a witness for the prosecution, testifies to an argument between D's wife and X sometime prior to the murder. If D was not
present at the argument, what actually took place is irrelevant; only what D
9. McCormick, Evidence § 36 (1954).
10. In re Chavez' Will, 39 N.M. 304, 305,46 P.2d 665, 666 (1935).
11. State v. Pruett, 22 N.M., 223, 234, 160 Pac. 362, 366 (1916).
12. State v. Smith, 32 N.M. 191, 202, 252 Pac. 1003, 1008 (1927).
13. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 54 N.M. 170, 216 P.2d 921 (1950) ; State v. Kile, 29 N.M.
55, 218 Pac. 347 (1923) ; State v. Newman, 29 N.M. 106, 219 Pac. 794 (1923).
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heard of the incident is important. Nevertheless, since the prosecution has introduced the irrelevant evidence, D will be allowed to rebut it. If D then places
W on the stand to testify that there was no such argument and the prosecution
wishes to impeach W's testimony on the matter, he will not be allowed to do so
by extrinsic evidence since the trial court has already determined the issue
is irrelevant (or collateral) .14 The subject is too far removed from the ultimate
issues to justify extrinsic evidence designed to cast doubt on W's testimony
concerning that subject. Of course, any inconsistent statement may in some
manner reflect on W's general credibility, but the reflection is too fuzzy to
warrant the expenditure of time and possible confusion of issues entailed by
extrinsic proof of the prior inconsistent statement.
III
NECESSITY OF AN INCONSISTENCY

A prior statement is of no value to the jury in assessing W's credibility unless
it is inconsistent with his testimony at trial. 15 Our cases have not discussed what
variance is required before the statements are "inconsistent ;" apparently something less than a direct, express contradiction will suffice.
Many New Mexico cases have established the rule that W's previous failure
to disclose facts given at trial may be shown if the witness would have been expected to speak in the situation. The evidence has been allowed where W had
"an opportunity to speak and where it would have been natural to speak," 16
where it was his "duty" to speak,' 7 where the situation "called for him to
speak,"' 8 and where he had "the opportunity and the duty to speak."' 1 For
example, in State v. Perkins,20 W originally implicated two men but later implicated another two and testified against them; the original two were not on
trial. Failure to initially implicate the other men was an omission which could be
shown as a prior inconsistent statement. Also, signing a complaint against the
original two was said to have been an inconsistent act.
The requirement that the omission be shown only when it would have been
14. State v. Kile, 29 N.M. 55, 218 Pac. 347 (1923) ; State v. Pruett, 22 N.M. 223, 160
Pac. 362 (1916). The facts of both cases are similar to the example.
15. Since the question of impeachment never arises unless W has given damaging
testimony, the problem of what form the statement on direct examination must take is
never discussed.
16. State v. Archer, 32 N.M. 319, 327, 255 Pac. 396, 400 (1927) (evidence also allowed
if it was his duty to speak).
17. State v. Perkins, 21 N.M. 135, 153 Pac. 258, 259 (1915).
18. State v. Kidd, 24 N.M. 572, 585, 175 Pac. 772, 776 (1918).
19. State v. Fletcher, 36 N.M. 47, 50, 7 P.2d 936, 938 (1932) (the court states the
rule as "opportunity or duty" in the same paragraph).
20. 21 N.M. 135, 153 Pac. 258 (1915).
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"natural" to speak is uncertain at best. Yet the New Mexico cases have allowed
the evidence only where there was a reasonable probability that W would have
spoken.
To prove that W did not make the statement at a prior hearing, the entire
21
record of the hearing may be allowed in evidence.

IV
EFFECT OF ADMISSION OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT

Sections 20-2-1, 20-2-2, and 20-2-4 do not explicitly state that if W admits
making the inconsistent statement the cross-examiner may not show the prior
inconsistent statement by extrinsic evidence. But the statutes do say extrinsic
proof will be permitted unless W distinctly admits making the statement, the
implication being that if he does admit making the statement extrinsic proof
will not be permitted. It should be noted, however, that only a distinct admission
will suffice. If W says he "does not remember" whether he made the prior
inconsistent statement, the cross-examiner may still introduce extrinsic proof
22
of the statement.

V
FOUNDATION FOR INTRODUCING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE

Extrinsic evidence offered to prove a prior inconsistent statement may not
be introduced unless a proper foundation has been laid. And the manner of
laying the foundation depends upon whether the prior inconsistent statement
was oral or written.
If cross-examiner wishes to prove an oral prior inconsistent statement, the
general rule is that he must ask W whether he made the statement, having first
mentioned "the time, the place, and the person" to whom the statement was
made.28 Our Supreme Court has said that a foundation is required to protect W
by giving him an opportunity to deny the statement, explain it, or reconcile it
with his present testimony. 24 Other courts find additional justification for the
rule in that it helps to avoid unfair surprise to the opposing party and saves the
28
court's time by making further proof unnecessary.
Obviously the purpose of the rule is fulfilled if W is given enough information
to jog his memory so that he will not deny the prior statement simply because
21. Territory v. Clark, 15 N.M. 35, 99 Pac. 697 (1909) (if error, it was not harmful).
22. State v. Rodriquez, 23 N.M. 156, 167 Pac. 426 (1917).
23. McCormick, Evidence § 37 (1954).
24. See, State v. Thompson, 68 N.M. 219, 360 P.2d 637 (1961) ; Nichols v. Sefcik, 66
N.M. 449, 349 P.2d 678 (1960) ; Maestas v. Christmas, 63 N.M. 447, 321 P.2d 631 (1958) ;
State v. Fletcher, 36 N.M. 47, 7 P.2d 936 (1932) ; State v. Carabajal, 26 N.M. 384, 193
Pac. 406 (1920).
25. McCormick, Evidence § 37 (1954).
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he has forgotton about it. This can be done without necessarily giving specific,
detailed information concerning the time, place, and person to whom the statement was made. The trial court should be allowed to hold that a foundation is
sufficient even if it does not strictly comply with the "time, place, and person"
rule if on the facts W has been adequately informed. Our statute leaves the door
open for such an approach, since it only says that "the circumstances of the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be mentioned to the witness. ' 2 6 Thus, the statute does not expressly require that the
27
time, place and person to whom the statement was made be mentioned to W.
In State v. Kidd,28 an early New Mexico case, the court interpreted the
statute as setting forth a flexible requirement: consideration will be given to all
the circumstances including the testimony preceding the impeaching question,
the question itself, and the answer to the impeaching question to see if W
received fair warning. 29 Although the impeaching question did not specifically
designate the place of the particular occasion, the court held that an adequate
foundation had been laid. A rigid "time, place, and person" rule would have
required exclusion of the extrinsic evidence.30
The court, however, soon began to change its attitude and follow a more
restricted rule. In Maestas v. Christmas,31 our Supreme Court affirmed exclusion of extrinsic proof of a prior inconsistent statement based on the trial court's
conclusion that the foundation was insufficient. W had made statements concerning the matter in issue on two prior occasions: at the time of the accident and
later at his home. On cross-examination, he was asked whether he had not
made an inconsistent statement "that night," which might have referred to either
occasion. In affirming the exclusion, the Supreme Court said:
This Court has laid down a strict and fixed rule that before a witness
may be impeached by proof of former contradictory statements, his
attention must be first directed to what may be brought forward for
that purpose. And, that this must be done with particularity as to
32
time, place and circumstances ....
As authority for the rule, the court cited State v. Fletcher,33 a case dealing
with the necessary foundation for showing a prior omission which was inconsis26. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-2 (1953).
27. The witness must also be asked "whether or not he did make such statement."
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-2 (1953). And the impeaching question must be identical to the

testimony of the impeaching witness. State v. Riley, 32 N.M. 83, 251 Pac. 384 (1926).
28. 24 N.M. 572, 175 Pac. 772 (1918).
29. State v. Kidd, 24 N.M. 572, 175 Pac. 772 (1918).
30. The trial court was reversed on other grounds. State v. Kidd, 24 N.M. 572, 175
Pac. 772 (1918).
31. 63 N.M. 447, 321 P.2d 631 (1958).
32. Maestas v. Christmas, 63 N.M. 447, 452-53, 321 P.2d 631, 635 (1958).
33. 36 N.M. 47, 7 P.2d 936 (1932).
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tent with W's testimony at trial. In Fletcher, the Supreme Court combined
the requirement that the witness have fair warning with a separate requirement which goes to the relevancy of the omission: the circumstances of the

omission must be such that one would naturally be expected to speak out
before the omission is relevant. As the court in Fletcher framed the requirement:
[TI he cross-examiner, before putting the impeaching question, must by
his cross-examination at least make a prima facie showing as to the
time, place, and circumstances of the omission, on the prior occasion,
sufficient to warrant the inference
that the opportunity for disclosure
34
and the duty to disclose existed.
Since the court was concerned primarily with the relevancy of the prior
omission-whether it was inconsistent with W'J's trial testimony-the case did
not support the determination in the Maestas case. And since the court in Maestas
merely affirmed the trial court's exclusion of extrinsic evidence, the case held
only that the trial court may, not that it must, rigidly apply the "time, place,
and person" rule.
In Nichols v. Sefcik, s5 the Supreme Court again affirmed exclusion of extrinsic evidence based upon the trial court's finding that a proper foundation
had not been laid. W had been asked whether he had discussed the case with one
of the parties "in Tucumcari or Amarillo" and whether he had told one of
the parties that the defendant had "quoted this price of 300 thousand. ' 3 6 The
impeaching witness was allowed to state whether he had had certain conversations with W in Tucumcari and Amarillo but not to state the substance
of the conversations. In affirming this exclusion, the court went one step further
than previous decisions, saying that "the details of the statement" must be called
to 'J"sattention.3 7 However, the actual defect seems to have been that the impeaching witness was not asked whether W had made the specific statement
referred to above but rather was asked if he had had "certain conversations"
with W. Clearly the testimony of the impeaching witness on anything other
than the specific statement could not come in since no foundation had been
laid.38 The court need not have added that the "details of the statement" must
be called to W's attention, thus inserting another element in an already cumbersome rule. The court also noted that the time and place of the particular
statement were "not too definitely fixed on cross-examination" 9 but did not
say the foundation was insufficient in those respects.
34. State v. Fletcher, 36 N.M. 47, 50, 7 P.2d 936, 938 (1932).
35. 66 N.M. 449, 349 P.2d 678 (1960).

36.
37.
38.
39.

Nichols v. Sefcik, 66 N.M. 449, 456-457, 349 P.2d 678, 683 (1960).
Nichols v. Sefcik, 66 N.M. 449, 457, 349 P.2d 678, 683 (1960).
See note 27, supra.
Nichols v. Sefcik, 66 N.M. 449, 457, 349 P.2d 678, 683 (1960).
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One year later, the Supreme Court in State v. Thompson" was faced with

the trial court's admission of extrinsic evidence based upon a foundation which
the Supreme Court deemed inadequate. On cross-examination defendant had

been asked, "Did you ever communicate a threat against the life of Jack Kasem
on or about December 10, 1958 to a Mr. Curley Maples or a man named Maples
whose nickname is Curley Maples ?" 41 Defendant replied that "there has never
been a threat made against Jack to anyone." 42 The trial court allowed the im43
peaching witness to testify over objection, but the Supreme Court reversed,
citing Section 20-2-2 and saying:
The statutory provisions are mandatory and it is clear that the question propounded to appellant on cross-examination failed to meet the
statutory test, particularly as to the place, the occasion, and the circumstances attending the making of the supposed statement. ....
.4

The holding of the Thompson case apparently is that a foundation is necessarily
inadequate if the place at which the alleged prior inconsistent statement was made
has not been mentioned to the witness. And the case further indicates that the
court would hold that a failure to mention the time or circumstances is also
fatal. Both the holding and the implication are unfortunate.
Insofar as the Thompson case itself is concerned, the witness probably received
adequate notice of the prior inconsistent statement that the prosecution had in
mind. Both the approximate date and the person to whom the statement was
allegedly made were pointed out.45 To exclude the prior inconsistent statement
simply because the place was not mentioned seems to put undue emphasis on form
at the expense of substance. As a rule of trial practice, the doctrine of Thompson
imposes dangerous and unwarranted limits on the trial judge's authority. Foundations will be found insufficient though W had adequate warning; valuable
evidence will be kept from the fact-finder. These risks need not be incurred. They
would be largely eliminated, and the purpose of the foundation requirement
would be fulfilled, if the trial court had the power to admit extrinsic proof of
a prior inconsistent statement where the information given W was sufficient to
apprise him of the statement to which the cross-examiner was referring. No
black-letter rule is desirable, since whether WI' was sufficiently apprised will
40. 68 N.M. 219, 360 P.2d 637 (1961).
41. State v. Thompson, 68 N.M. 219, 221, 360 P.2d 637 (1961).
42. State v. Thompson, 68 N.M. 219, 221, 360 P.2d 637 (1961).
43. Since the impeaching witness was testifying in rebuttal, his testimony regarding
the alleged prior inconsistent statement could not come in as an admission to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. The evidence should have been offered in the case in chief.
State v. Thompson, 68 N.M. 219,.360 P.2d 637 (1961).
44. State v. Thompson, 68 N.M. 219, 222, 360 P.2d 637, 639 (1961).
45. Also, the witness was a party to the action, a fact which is normally sufficient
to allow dispensing with the foundation requirement. See text at note 54, infra.
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depend on the facts of the particular case. Indeed, it is arguable that the trial
court should have discretion to admit the evidence even though no foundation
has been laid. After all, f's interest is not the only one to be considered. There
is also an interest in placing relevant material before the fact-finder. Though
such discretion is not permitted under our statute, the court could at least maintain the flexibility permitted by the statute. The Thompson case should be
abandoned-overruled or quietly forgotten-and the language or the statute
should be established as the test, the sole test, for determining the sufficiency
of a foundation.
The familiar Queen Caroline's Case46 established the rule that before a witness may be cross-examined as to a previous inconsistent writing the writing must
have been shown to him. Section 20-2-2 is substantially identical to the statute
enacted in England to abrogate this rule.47 Under our statute, the written statement need not be shown to W prior to cross-examination. However, if crossexaminer wishes to introduce the writing to prove the prior inconsistent statement, he must first bring W's attention "to those parts of the writing which
are to be used for the purpose of so contradicting him," 48 either by showing or
reading the statement to him. 49 The statute, which is in accord with the Uniform
Rules of Evidence,50 provides reasonable limits for impeaching a witness by
proof of a prior inconsistent statement made in writing. Adequate protection is
given the witness while cross-examiner retains an effective rteans of impeachment.
An early New Mexico case held that if the deposition of a witness who is
not present at trial is offered in evidence, a written prior inconsistent statement
shown to him at the deposition cannot be introduced at trial to prove he was
impeached unless the foundation was laid at the deposition. 51 The witness must
have been given the same opportunity to explain the inconsistent writing as he
52
would have if he were present at the trial.
Erroneous failure to allow cross-examiner to lay a foundation for impeachment
is not reversible error if extrinsic proof of the prior inconsistent statement is admitted despite the absence of a foundation.53 The result is based upon the theory
that a foundation is required to protect the witness, not to allow the cross46. 2 Brod. & Bing. 284, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820). See Kirchner v. Laughlin, 6
N.M. 300, 28 Pac. 505 (1892) (noting the statute did not change the requirement of a
foundation for introducing the writing).
47. St., 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, § 24.
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. §20-2-1 (1953); Lopez v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Ry., 60 N.M. 134, 288 P.2d 678 (1955).
49. United States v. Fuller, 5 N.M. (Gild.) 80,4 N.M. (John) 358, 20 Pac. 175 (1889).
50. Uniform Rule of Evidence 22 in 4 Jones, Evidence, Civil and Criminal (5th Ed.
1958).
51. Sandell v. Norment, 19 N.M. 549, 145 Pac. 259 (1915).
52. Sandell v. Norment, 19 N.M. 549, 145 Pac. 259 (1915) ; see also McCormick, Evidence § 37 (1954).
53. State v. Carabajal, 26 N.M. 384, 193 Pac. 406 (1920).
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examiner to prove the prior inconsistent statement through an admission by W.
This theory is questionable. There might be instances where exclusion of the
foundation would be harmful. An admission by W that he made the prior inconsistent statement may do more to impeach his credibility than the testimony
of another that W did make an inconsistent statement. Where the prior inconsistent statement is proven by extrinsic testimony, the weight to be given the inconsistency depends on the credibility of the extrinsic evidence. If W would have
admitted the prior inconsistent statement and if the credibility of the impeaching
witness would have been impeached, the trial court's action in preventing a party
from obtaining W's admission should be deemed erroneous and should lead to
reversal if the circumstances of the case warrant.
Most courts do not require a foundation for introduction of a prior inconsistent
statement if the prior statement is an admission by a party to the action. 54 New
Mexico, however, in State v. Thompson,55 required that a foundation be laid
if the statement cannot be used as affirmative evidence because it had been offered
in rebuttal. No mention was made of two prior decisions in the New Mexico
Federal District Court. 56 Thus, the rule might be that no foundation is necessary if the statement may be used as an admission but that a foundation is
necessary if the statement must be used as a prior inconsistent statement. This
is an anomalous result since the normal theory is that no foundation is required
for an admission because the party knows the issues in the case and will not be
unduly surprised by the statement and will have an opportunity to explain the
inconsistency sometime during the trial.5 7 The same theory should hold if the
statement is used for impeachment. Nevertheless, perhaps the Supreme Court
recognizes that there are situations where the party is surprised by a prior inconsistent statement and should have the opportunity to explain before extrinsic
evidence is offered. Although the admission rule is well settled and not likely
to be changed, no reason appears why a foundation should not be required when
the statement is used for impeachment.
The common law placed various restrictions on impeaching one's own witness. Under Section 20-2-4 a party may impeach his own witness by showing a
prior inconsistent statement if the witness "in the opinion of the trial judge,
proves adverse." Numerous problems have arisen in interpreting this language.
Our court early established the requirement that before a witness may be
deemed adverse within the meaning of the statute he must first have given
54. See McCormick, Evidence § 37 (1954).
55. 68 N.M. 219, 360 P.2d 637 (1961).
56. Central Surety & Ins. Co. v. Davidson, 46 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1931) ; United
States v. Adamson, 184 Fed. 714 (8th Cir. 1910). Both cases held that the prior inconsistent statement was an admission and therefore no foundation was necessary for its
introduction. But cf. State v. Rodriquez, 23 N.M. 156, 167 Pac. 426 (1917).
57. McCormick, Evidence § 37 (1954).
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affirmative testimony which is prejudicial to the examiner.58 If the witness merely
responds "I don't remember," he has not given testimony hostile or prejudicial to
the examiner and the trial court will be reversed for allowing such a witness to be
impeached. 59 Although the court has offered no explanation for the rule, the
theory probably is that since the witness has not given affirmative testimony he is
simply "neutral" rather than "adverse." Using this theory, a witness cannot be
adverse unless his testimony has been harmful. Apparently the court believes
that "I don't remember" cannot be harmful. This may be true in most instances,
but not always. For example, if cross-examiner asks D if he has made a contradictory statement to W and D denies that he has, a statement by W that he does
not remember if D made such a statement will probably be taken by the jury
as an assertion that D never made the statement. lW's statement is harmful. In
only one case has our Supreme Court held that "I don't remember" was not
harmful ; it is free to find such an answer harmful if the circumstances warrant.
If a party knows that W's testimony will be harmful but that W has made a
prior statement that is helpful to the party, then the party might call W! for the
sole purpose of eliciting his harmful testimony as a basis for introducing the
prior staiement as a prior inconsistent statement. This certainly can be done
if the only requirement for W"s being "adverse" is that he give affirmative
testimony harmful to the proponent. And, although the prior statement cannot
properly be used as proof of the matter asserted (it is hearsay for that purpose),
the jury may well use it as such proof and the party may be permitted, in effect,
to circumvent the hearsay rule. This circumvention would be the result of not
requiring something in addition to harm as a prerequisite to impeaching one's
own witness.
Three cases have dealt with the question of whether something more than
"harm" is required before a party's own witness will be said to have proven
adverse. In State v. Hite,0° the court noted that the statute apparently broadens
the common-law rule which required a showing of "surprise" as an additional
check against circumventing the hearsay rule. However, this statement was pure
dictum since the court reversed on the ground that f's testimony had not been
harmful to the party who called him. Also, W had given affirmative testimony
at a grand jury hearing and seems to have surprised the examiner by his claimed
inability to recall facts testified to at the hearing. In State v. Lopez, 61 the witness
did not testify as expected and the trial court allowed impeachment. Surprise
clearly was present, and no mention was made of the Hite dictum. Finally, in
State v. Garcia,62 a key witness for the state did an about-face when cross58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

State v. Hite, 24 N.M. 23, 172 Pac. 419 (1918).
State v. Hite, 24 N.M. 23, 172 Pac. 419 (1918).
24 N.M. 23, 172 Pac. 419 (1918).
46 N.M. 463, 131 P.2d 273 (1942).
57 N.M. 166, 256 P.2d 532 (1953).
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examined. On re-direct examination, he refused to again give testimony favorable
to the state. The Supreme Court found the witness to have been "hostile" and
affirmed the trial court's action in allowing impeachment of the witness by introducing an affidavit consistent with his original testimony. Although the court
did not speak of surprise, it certainly seems to have been present.
The Supreme Court has not established a rule that surprise is not required
before a witness may "prove adverse ;" on the contrary, surprise appears to have
been present in every case.
Section 20-2-4 says that you may impeach your own witness if he "proves
adverse." The quoted words can be construed to mean "comes to be adverse to
the calling party." So construed, W could not be impeached if the calling party
knew before trial that W's testimony would be harmful since a witness "proves
adverse" only if the facts showing him to be adverse come out for the first time
during his examination at trial. This not only is a tenable construction, but it is
the only sensible construction. It is absurd to permit impeachment of a witness
who is called solely for the purpose of being impeached. Section 21-1-1 (43) (b)
provides that a "hostile or unwilling" witness may be examined through leading
questions. Under this section, impeachment is permitted only if the witness is
an adverse party. Since the mere hostile witness is treated differently from the
adverse party under 21-1-1 (43) (b), the implication is that the hostile witness
cannot be impeached. Before the witness is adverse and can be impeached
something more is required; and it is suggested that that something should
be "surprise."
An additional question is whether one's own witness may be asked on direct
examination whether he has made a prior inconsistent statement, even though
he has not proven to be adverse. That is, does the "adverse" requirement only
go to introduction of extrinsic evidence? In an early New Mexico case, the
Supreme Court indicated that this question should be answered in the affirmative
since it upheld the trial court's ruling that a party's own witness may be examined as to a prior inconsistent statement in an effort to obtain an admission
from the witness himself. 63 No mention was made of the "adverse" witness
requirement. Although the danger of subterfuge perhaps is not as great when
the party is not allowed to offer extrinsic evidence, the case establishes a rule
which is difficult to justify and therefore should not be followed. Nothing in
the statute indicates that the "adverse" witness requirement goes only to the
introduction of extrinsic evidence.
The proponent of a witness may read a prior inconsistent writing to the witness for the purpose of refreshing his recollection, in which case it is unnecessary
63. State v. Fernandez, 37 N.M. 151, 19 P.2d 1048 (1933).
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to find the witness to be adverse.6 4 A traditional mode of direct examination,
65
this rule raises a whole area of problems beyond the scope of this article.
VI
COMPETENCY OF THE IMPEACHING EVIDENCE

All evidence offered for consideration by the trier of fact must meet some
minimum standard of competency. Impeaching evidence is no exception. 66 New
Mexico cases have discussed the competency of only two types of evidence
offered to prove a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment: ( 1) confessions
and (2) statements made at an inquest without jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in State v. TurnboW, 67 ruled that a confession may not
be introduced as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach unless the trial court
issatisfied that the confession was voluntarily given. Yet, even though the
foundation has not been laid "the state may initially cross-examine a defendant
as to whether he has made a statement contrary to his testimony, but upon his
denial thereof or his claimed inability to recall, may proceed no further."6 8 The
rule allowing cross-examination as to specific statements apparently follows
from an earlier case (not mentioned in the opinion) which held that if W's
prior statement was anything less than an acknowledgment of guilt, it is not a
confession.6 9 And since it is not a confession, no foundation is required for its
introduction. Such a result is consistent with the confession rule as it has
developed. Nevertheless, since an admission establishes a fact from which guilt
may be inferred, cross-examination concerning the admission should not be permitted if the policy of requiring a voluntary confession is to be carried out.
Otherwise, in order to avoid the confession rule all the cross-examiner need do
is ask W about each element of the crime instead of whether he is guilty.
A prior inconsistent statement may be proved though made at an inquest
which was without jurisdiction.70 Inasmuch as a prior statement may be shown
though not made at a formal hearing, the rule seems proper.
JERALD JACOB MONROE
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